Volume 10 · Number 2 · Pages 267–270
Primacy of Consciousness and Enactive Imagination. Review of Waking, Dreaming, Being: Self and Consciousness in Neuroscience, Meditation and Philosophy by Evan Thompson

Elizaveta Solomonova

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Abstract

Upshot: This interdisciplinary work draws on phenomenology, Indian philosophy, Tibetan Buddhism, cognitive neurosciences and a variety of personal and literary examples of conscious phenomena. Thompson proposes a view of consciousness and self as dynamic embodied processes, co-dependent with the world. According to this view, dreaming is a process of spontaneous imagination and not a delusional hallucination. This work aims at laying the ground for systematic neurophenomenological investigation of first-person experience.

Citation

Solomonova E. (2015) Primacy of consciousness and enactive imagination. Review of waking, dreaming, being: Self and consciousness in neuroscience, meditation and philosophy by evan thompson. Constructivist Foundations 10(2): 267–270. http://constructivist.info/10/2/267

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