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Open peer commentary on the article “Exploring the Depth of Dream Experience: The Enactive Framework and Methods for Neurophenomenological Research” by Elizaveta Solomonova & Xin Wei Sha. Upshot: Neurophenomenology requires a first-person report at the sub-personal level. Thus, the neurophenomenology of dreaming and sleep can be figuratively located in a model of perspectives and levels of analysis. Even when Solomonova and Sha do admit creativity to explain bizarreness and emphasize dreams’ enaction and, especially, dreams’ perception-dependence, an innate and developmental framework of neurophenomenology becomes a requirement to understand fully its sub-personal counterpart, i.e., sleep, especially the evidence derived from innate processing observed during the sleep of neonates - even without the dreaming counterpart. Finally, precisions about the depth of dreaming in Hobson’s work are presented.
Rosales-Lagarde A. (2016) Neurophenomenology’s epistemological locus and the need to consider its primitive sources: Internal processing and development. Constructivist Foundations 11(2): 427–429. http://constructivist.info/11/2/427
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