Volume 13 · Number 1 · Pages 98–99
Protention and Predictive Processing: The Wave of the Future

Dan Lloyd

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Abstract

Open peer commentary on the article “The Past, Present and Future of Time-Consciousness: From Husserl to Varela and Beyond” by Shaun Gallagher. Upshot: Gallagher’s main claim can be enhanced neurophenomenologically. In his 1907 lectures Thing and Space, Husserl argued that perception in general is enactive. Moreover, the neuroscientific theory of predictive processing connects neatly to a future-oriented phenomenology.

Citation

Lloyd D. (2017) Protention and predictive processing: The wave of the future. Constructivist Foundations 13(1): 98–99. http://constructivist.info/13/1/098

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References

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