Volume 13 · Number 1 · Pages 107–109
The Transcendental Character of Temporality and the Buddhist Contribution to Time-Consciousness

Stefano Poletti

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Abstract

Open peer commentary on the article “The Past, Present and Future of Time-Consciousness: From Husserl to Varela and Beyond” by Shaun Gallagher. Upshot: Enriching the parallel between transcendental phenomenology and enactivism, I briefly discuss the compatibility of the Buddhist perspective with Gallagher’s contribution to time-consciousness. Grounded in his meditative practice and heartfelt engagement with Buddhist philosophy, Varela de-constructed representationalism and its underpinning metaphysical dualism, building up the generative concept of enaction. His approach has been deeply inspired by Madhyamika Buddhism, which describes time-consciousness as that double illusion that frames phenomena as either becoming or permanent.

Citation

Poletti S. (2017) The transcendental character of temporality and the buddhist contribution to time-consciousness. Constructivist Foundations 13(1): 107–109. http://constructivist.info/13/1/107

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