Volume 13 · Number 1 · Pages 169–171
“Posing | Solving” Can Be Explained Without Representations, Because It Is a Form of Perception-Action

Matthew Isaac Harvey

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Abstract

Open peer commentary on the article “From Problem Solving to Problem Posing, and from Strategies to Laying Down a Path in Solving: Taking Varela’s Ideas to Mathematics Education Research” by Jérôme Proulx & Jean-François Maheux. Upshot: The target article succeeds in conceptualizing mathematical problem-solving as a form of organism-environment coupling. So conceived, it is a suitable subject for both enactive and ecological descriptions, and is open to embodied, dynamical explanations that have no need for cognitivist models. In other words, Proulx and Maheux have shown how to get across the “cognitive gap.”

Citation

Harvey M. I. (2017) “posing | solving” can be explained without representations, because it is a form of perception-action. Constructivist Foundations 13(1): 169–171. http://constructivist.info/13/1/169

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