Volume 13 · Number 2 · Pages 241–249
Authors’ Response: If First-Person Knowledge is Excavated, What Kind of Research Follows?

Urban Kordeš & Ema Demšar

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Abstract

Upshot: We begin our response by restating and clarifying the principal argument of the target article. We go on to focus on four main themes addressed by the commentators: (a) the question of the inevitability of a horizon in enacting beliefs about experience; (b) the consequences of our epistemological position for second-person research methodologies; (c) the importance of distinguishing between the feeling of veracity of what is observed and the unquestioned realistic intuitions of the natural attitude; and finally (d) the implications of our discussion for first-person science. We conclude by addressing the question about the relationship between inferred and apprehended experience.

Citation

Kordeš U. & Demšar E. (2018) Authors’ response: If first-person knowledge is excavated, what kind of research follows? Constructivist Foundations 13(2): 241–249. http://constructivist.info/13/2/241

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