Volume 13 · Number 2 · Pages 274–276
Are Our Limbs Agents that Need to Estimate Our Intentions?

Martin Flament Fultot

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Abstract

Open peer commentary on the article “Applying Radical Constructivism to Machine Learning: A Pilot Study in Assistive Robotics” by Markus Nowak, Claudio Castellini & Carlo Massironi. Upshot: I argue that the authors miss an important distinction between realism and representationalism. Because of this, their diagnosis of the current state of machine learning is valid, but for the wrong reasons. As a consequence, their approach to upper limb prosthetics may not be a step in the right direction.

Citation

Fultot M. F. (2018) Are our limbs agents that need to estimate our intentions? Constructivist Foundations 13(2): 274–276. http://constructivist.info/13/2/274

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