Volume 14 · Number 1 · Pages 1–8
Shaun Gallagher and the Sciences of the Mind: Recontextualizing “Decentered” Cognition

Nicolas Zaslawski & Mathieu Arminjon

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Abstract

Context: Shaun Gallagher’s work is very influential in contemporary philosophy, especially when it comes to the mind, to philosophical issues raised by developmental psychology, and to intersubjectivity. Problem: Classical cognitivism” has been, and often still is dominating the sciences of the mind. The reasons for this dominance include being implementable on computers, being consistent with Darwinism, and being allegedly experimentally testable. However, this dominance could just as well be a historical phase as cognitivism is disconnected from biological, anthropological, and neuroscientific research. Method: We historically and epistemologically contextualize how Gallagher contributed to bringing the body and subjectivity back to the center of the sciences of the mind by focusing on two examples: theory of mind and evolutionary psychology. Results: Both contemporary epistemologists and Gallagher’s work indicate why classical cognitivism provides a flawed model of cognition, especially when it comes to its explanatory scope: embodiment, subjectivity, and intersubjectivity, among other things, are fundamentally mistreated by cognitivism. Implications: Gallagher helped to structure what Andler calls “heterodoxical” approaches to cognition by conceptualizing a unifying framework, the so-called “E-approaches.” This unification has the major implication of leading Gallagher to a model in which cognition is “decentered,” which helps tackle the philosophical issues one might encounter when narrowing down philosophy of cognition. Constructivist content: We apply E-approaches to the philosophy of cognition, psychology and social sciences.

Key words: Philosophy of mind, philosophy of cognitive science, history of science, embodiment, E-approaches

Citation

Zaslawski N. & Arminjon M. (2018) Shaun gallagher and the sciences of the mind: Recontextualizing “decentered” cognition. Constructivist Foundations 14(1): 1–8. http://constructivist.info/14/1/001

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Comment by Michael Zeldich · 15 Nov 2018
The illusion of “Consciousness”
What could we know about the concepts of “Intellect” and “Consciousness”?
Dylan Wiliam, in his paper “The half-second delay: what follows?” abstract stating “There is an increasing body of evidence that only a minuscule proportion of the sensory data processed by the unconscious mind (capable of processing approximately 11 million bits per second) is referred to the conscious mind (capable of processing approximately 50 bits per second). It is also clear that conscious awareness of stimuli from the environment lags actual perception by approximately half a second, but that a backward referral of subjective experience results in an individual’s perception of the stimulus and its conscious awareness as simultaneous.”
From this, we could conclude that we do not make decisions consciously.
However, sometimes we are able to give explanations about what happened and why it happened. The ability to provide an explanation of the results of inner workings of our brain is what gives us a sense of what is called the “conscious” state. Usually, that state is called a “conscious awareness state”.