Volume 14 · Number 1 · Pages 8–21
Decentering the Brain: Embodied Cognition and the Critique of Neurocentrism and Narrow-Minded Philosophy of Mind

Shaun Gallagher

Download the full text in
PDF (228 kB)

> Citation > Similar > References > Add Comment


Context: Challenges by embodied, enactive, extended and ecological approaches to cognition have provided good reasons to shift away from neurocentric theories. Problem: Classic cognitivist accounts tend towards internalism, representationalism and methodological individualism. Such accounts not only picture the brain as the central and almost exclusive mechanism of cognition, they also conceive of brain function in terms that ignore the dynamical relations among brain, body and environment. Method: I review four areas of research (perception, action/agency, self, social cognition) where enactivist accounts have shown alternative ways of thinking about the brain. Results: Taken together, such analyses form a comprehensive alternative to the classic conceptions of cognitivist, computational neuroscience. Implications: Such considerations motivate the need to re-think our understanding of how the brain itself works. They suggest that the best explanation of brain function may be found in the mixed vocabularies of embodied and situated cognition, developmental psychology, ecological psychology, dynamic systems theory, applied linguistics, the theory of affordances and material engagement, rather than the narrow vocabulary of computational neuroscience. Constructivist content: This account is consistent with an enactivist-constructivist approach to cognition.

Key words: Internalism, perception, agency, autonomy, self, social cognition, predictive processing, enactivism.


Gallagher S. (2018) Decentering the brain: Embodied cognition and the critique of neurocentrism and narrow-minded philosophy of mind. Constructivist Foundations 14(1): 8–21. http://constructivist.info/14/1/008

Export article citation data: Plain Text · BibTex · EndNote · Reference Manager (RIS)

Similar articles

Urrestarazu H. (2011) Autopoietic Systems: A Generalized Explanatory Approach – Part 2
Butz M. V. (2008) How and Why the Brain Lays the Foundations for a Conscious Self
Urrestarazu H. (2011) Autopoietic Systems: A Generalized Explanatory Approach – Part 1
Urrestarazu H. (2014) Social Autopoiesis?
Kauffman L. H. (2017) Mathematical Work of Francisco Varela


Allen M. & Friston K. J. (2018) From cognitivism to autopoiesis: Towards a computational framework for the embodied mind. Synthese 195(6): 2459–2482 http://cepa.info/4099
Anderson M. & Chemero A. (2017) The brain evolved to guide action. In: Shepherd S. V. (ed.) The Wiley handbook of evolutionary neuroscience John Wiley, New York: 1–20. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Anderson M. L. (2010) Neural reuse: A fundamental reorganizing principle of the brain. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33: 245–266. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Andler D. (2016) La silhouette de l’humain. Quelle place pour le naturalisme dans le monde d’aujourd’hui? Editions Gallimard, Paris. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Anisfeld M. (2005) No compelling evidence to dispute Piaget’s timetable of the development of representational imitation in infancy. In: Rizzolatti G., Hurley S. & Chater N. (eds.) Perspectives on imitation: From neuroscience to social science. MIT Press, Cambridge MA: 107–131. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Apps M. A. & Tsakiris M. (2014) The free-energy self: A predictive coding account of self-recognition. Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews 41: 85–97. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Baird J. A. & Baldwin D. A. (2001) Making sense of human behavior: Action parsing and intentional inference. In: Malle B. F., Moses L. J. & Baldwin D. A. (eds.) Intentions and intentionality: Foundations of social cognition. MIT Press, Cambridge MA. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Baldwin D. A. & Baird J. A. (2001) Discerning intentions in dynamic human action. Trends in Cognitive Science 5(4): 171–78. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Baron-Cohen S. (1995) Mindblindness: An essay on autism and theory of mind. MIT Press, Cambridge MA. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Barrett L. F. & Bar M. (2009) See it with feeling: Affective predictions during object perception. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B 364(1521): 1325–1334. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Barrett L. F. & Simmons W. K. (2015) Interoceptive predictions in the brain. Nature Reviews Neuroscience 16(7): 419–429. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Barsalou L. W. (2008) Grounding cognition. Annual Review of Psychology 59: 617–645. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Bedny M. & Caramazza A. (2011) Perception, action and word meanings in the human brain: The case from action verbs. Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences 1224: 81–95. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Berlucchi G. & Aglioti S. M. (2010) The body in the brain revisited. Experimental brain research 200(1): 25. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Binkofski F. & Buccino G. (2004) Motor functions of the Broca’s region. Brain and language 89(2): 362–369. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Bitbol M. & Gallagher S. (2018) Autopoiesis and the free energy principle. Comment on Ramsted, Badcock and Friston. Physics of Life Review 24: 24–26 http://cepa.info/5407
Blakemore S.-J. & Frith U. (2005) The learning brain: Lessons for education. Blackwell Publishing, Malden. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Broca P. (1861) Remarks on the seat of the faculty of articulated language, following an observation of aphemia (loss of speech) Bulletin de la Société Anatomique 6: 330–357. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Bruineberg J., Kiverstein J. & Rietveld E. (2018) The anticipating brain is not a scientist: The free-energy principle from an ecological-enactive perspective. Synthese 195(6): 2417–2444 http://cepa.info/4497
Carruthers P. (2015) Perceiving mental states. Consciousness and Cognition 36: 498–507. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Chanes L. & Barrett L. F. (2016) Redefining the role of limbic areas in cortical processing. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 20(2): 96–106. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Christman J. (2004) Relational autonomy, liberal individualism, and the social constitution of selves. Philosophical Studies 117(1): 143–164. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Clark A. (2016) Surfing uncertainty: Prediction, action and the embodied mind. Oxford University Press, Oxford. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Coghill G. E. (1929) Anatomy and the problem of behaviour. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge MA. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Colombetti G. (2014) The feeling body: Affective science meets the enactive mind. MIT Press, Cambridge MA. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Craik F. I. M., Moroz T. M., Moscovitch M., Stuss D. T., Winocur G., Tulving E. & Kapur S. (1999) In search of the self: A positron emission tomography study. Psychological Science 10: 26–34. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Crick F. (1994) The astonishing hypothesis: The scientific search for the soul. Charles Scribner’s Sons, New York. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
De Jaegher H., Di Paolo E. & Gallagher S. (2010) Does social interaction constitute social cognition? Trends in Cognitive Sciences 14(10): 441–447 http://cepa.info/4349
Dehaene S. (2005) Evolution of human cortical circuits for reading and arithmetic: The “neuronal recycling” hypothesis. In: Dehaene S., Duhamel J.-R., Hauser M. D. & Rizzolatti G. (eds.) From monkey brain to human brain. MIT Press, Cambridge MA: 131–157. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Dennett D. C. (1991) Consciousness explained. Little, Brown & Co, New York. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Di Paolo E. A. & De Jaegher H. (2012) The interactive brain hypothesis. Frontiers in human neuroscience 6:163 http://cepa.info/761
Di Paolo E., Buhrmann T. & Barandiaran X. (2017) Sensorimotor life: An enactive proposal. Oxford University Press, Oxford. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
D’Argembeau A., Ruby P., Collette F., Degueldre C., Balteau E., Luxen A., Maquet P. & Salmon E. (2007) Distinct regions of the medial prefrontal cortex are associated with self-referential processing and perspective-taking. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience 19: 935–944. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Fingelkurts A. A. & Fingelkurts A. A. (2017) Three-dimensional components of selfhood in treatment-naive patients with major depressive disorder: A resting-state qEEG imaging study. Neuropsychologia 99: 30–36. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Fossati P., Hevenor S. J., Graham S. J., Grady C., Keightley M. L., Craik F. & Mayberg H. (2003) In search of the emotional self: An fMRI study using positive and negative emotional words. American Journal of Psychiatry 160: 1938–1945. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Fotopoulou A. (2012) Towards psychodynamic neuroscience. In: Fotopoulou A., Conway M. & Pfaff D. (eds.) From the couch to the lab: Trends in psychodynamic neuroscience. Oxford University Press, New York: 25–47. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Frankfurt H. (1982) The importance of what we care about. Synthese 53(2): 257–272. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Freund P., Friston K., Thompson A. J., Stephan K. E., Ashburner J., Bach D. R., Nagy Z., Helms G., Draganski B., Mohammadi S., Schwab M. E., Curt A. & Weiskopf N. (2018) Embodied neurology: An integrative framework for neurological disorders. Brain 139(6): 1855–1861. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Friston K., Adams R. A., Perrinet L. & Breakspear M. (2012) Perceptions as hypotheses: Saccades as experiments. Frontiers in Psychology 3: 151. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Frith C. & Friston K. (2015) A duet for one. Consciousness and Cognition 36: 390–405. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Fuchs T. (2018) Ecology of the brain: The phenomenology and biology of the embodied mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Gallagher S. & Allen M. (2018) Active inference, enactivism and the hermeneutics of social cognition. Synthese 195(6): 2627–2648 http://cepa.info/4222
Gallagher S. & Bower M. (2014) Making enactivism even more embodied. AVANT 5(2): 232–247 http://cepa.info/4495
Gallagher S. & Daly A. (2018) Dynamical relations in the self-pattern. Frontiers in Psychology 9: 664. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Gallagher S. & Meltzoff A. (1996) The earliest sense of self and others: Merleau-Ponty and recent developmental studies. Philosophical Psychology 9(2): 213–236. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Gallagher S. & Zahavi D. (2012) The phenomenological mind. Routledge, London. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Gallagher S. (2000) Philosophical conceptions of the self: Implications for cognitive science. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 4(1): 14–21 http://cepa.info/4360
Gallagher S. (2001) The practice of mind: Theory, simulation, or primary interaction? Journal of Consciousness Studies 8(5–7): 83–107. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Gallagher S. (2005) How the body shapes the mind. Oxford University Press, Oxford. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Gallagher S. (2006) Where’s the action? Epiphenomenalism and the problem of free will. In: Banks W., Pockett S. & Gallagher S. (eds.) Does consciousness cause behavior? An investigation of the nature of volition. MIT Press, Cambridge MA: 109–124. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Gallagher S. (2007) The natural philosophy of agency. Philosophy Compass 2(2): 347–357. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Gallagher S. (2008) Direct perception in the intersubjective context. Consciousness and Cognition 17: 535–543. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Gallagher S. (2008) Inference or interaction: Social cognition without precursors. Philosophical Explorations 11(3): 163–173. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Gallagher S. (2012) Multiple aspects of agency. New Ideas in Psychology 30: 15–31. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Gallagher S. (2013) A pattern theory of self. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 7(443): 1–7. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Gallagher S. (2013) Ambiguity in the sense of agency. In: Clark A., Kiverstein J. & Vierkant T. (eds.) Decomposing the will. Oxford University Press, Oxford: 118–135. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Gallagher S. (2013) Intersubjectivity and psychopathology. In: Fulford B., Davies M., Graham G., Sadler J. & Stanghellini G. (eds.) Oxford Handbook of philosophy of psychiatry. Oxford University Press, Oxford: 258–274. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Gallagher S. (2015) Reuse and body-formatted representations in simulation theory. Cognitive Systems Research 34–35: 35–43. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Gallagher S. (2015) Seeing things in the right way: Normativity in social perception. In: Doyon M. & Breyer T. (eds.) Normativity in Perception. Palgrave-Macmillan, Basingstoke: 117–127. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Gallagher S. (2017) Enactivist interventions: Rethinking the mind. Oxford University Press, Oxford. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Gallagher S. (2018) Building a stronger concept of embodiment. In: Newen A., de Bruin L. & Gallagher S. (eds.) The Oxford handbook of 4E cognition. Oxford University Press, Oxford: 353–367. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Gallagher S., Hutto D., Slaby J. & Cole J. (2013) The brain as part of an enactive system. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 36(4): 421–422 http://cepa.info/2510
Gallese V. (2001) The “shared manifold” hypothesis: From mirror neurons to empathy. Journal of Consciousness Studies 8: 33–50. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Gallese V. (2014) Bodily selves in relation: Embodied simulation as second-person perspective on intersubjectivity. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 369: 20130177. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Gallup G. G., Anderson J. R. & Platek S. M. (2011) Self-recognition. In: Gallagher S. (ed.) The Oxford handbook of the self. Oxford University Press, Oxford: 80–110. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Garcia E. & Di Paolo E. (2018) Embodied coordination and psychotherapeutic outcome: Beyond simple mappings. Frontiers in Psychology 9: 1257. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2018.01257.
Gazzaniga M. S. (1998) The mind’s past. University of California Press, Berkeley. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Gibson J. J. (1977) The theory of affordances. In: Shaw R. & Bransford J. (eds.) Perceiving, acting, and knowing. Erlbaum, Hillsdale NJ: 67–82. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Gillihan S. J. & Farah M. J. (2005) Is self special? A critical review of evidence from experimental psychology and cognitive neuroscience. Psychological Bulletin 131(1): 76–97. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Goldman A. & de Vignemont F. (2009) Is social cognition embodied? Trends in Cognitive Sciences 13(4): 154–159. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Goldman A. (2006) Simulating minds: The philosophy, psychology and neuroscience of mindreading. Oxford University Press, Oxford. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Goldman A. I. (2012) A moderate approach to embodied cognitive science. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 3(1): 71–88. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Goldman A. I. (2014) The bodily formats approach to embodied cognition. In: Kriegel U. (ed.) Current controversies in philosophy of mind. Routledge, New York: 91–108 http://cepa.info/5191
Goodwin C. (2000) Action and embodiment within situated human interaction. Journal of Pragmatics 32: 1489–1522. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Goodwin C. (2017) Co-operative action. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Gopnik A. & Meltzoff A. N. (1997) Words, thoughts and theories. MIT Press, Cambridge MA. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Gutchess A. H., Kensinger E. A., Yoon C., Schacter D. L. (2007) Ageing and the self-reference effect in memory. Memory 15: 822–837. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Haggard P. & Eimer M. (1999) On the relation between brain potentials and the awareness of voluntary movements. Experimental Brain Research 126: 128–133. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Haggard P. & Magno E. (1999) Localising awareness of action with transcranial magnetic stimulation. Experimental Brain Research 127: 102–107. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Haggard P. (2017) Sense of agency in the human brain. Nature Reviews Neuroscience 18(4): 196–207. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Helmholtz H. von (1867) Handbuch der physiologischen Optik. Leopold Voss, Leipzig. English translation: Helmholtz H. (2005) Treatise on physiological optics. Edited by J. Southall. Dover Publications, Mineola NY. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Hobson P. (1993) The emotional origins of social understanding. Philosophical Psychology 6: 227–249. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Hobson P. (2002) The cradle of thought. Macmillan, London. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Hohwy J. & Michael J. (2017) Why should any body have a self. In: De Vignemont F. & Alsmith A. (eds.) The subject’s matter. MIT Press, Cambridge MA: 363–391. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Hohwy J. (2013) The predictive mind. Oxford University Press, Oxford. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Hohwy J. (2016) The self-evidencing brain. Noûs 50(2): 259–285. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Huber L. & Kutschenko L. K. (2009) Medicine in a neurocentric world: About the explanatory power of neuroscientific models in medical research and practice. Medicine Studies 1(4): 307–313. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Hurley S. L. (1998) Consciousness in action. Harvard University Press, Cambridge MA. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Husserl E. (1989) Ideas pertaining to a pure phenomenology and to a phenomenological philosophy – Second Book: Studies in the phenomenology of constitution. Translated by Rojcewicz R. & Schuwer A. Kluwer Academic, Dordrecht. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Hutto D. D. & Myin E. (2013) Radicalizing enactivism: Basic minds without content. MIT Press, Cambridge MA. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Hutto D., Gallagher S., Ilundáin-Agurruza J. & Hipólito I. (in press) Culture in mind – An enactivist account: Not cognitive penetration but cultural permeation. In: Kirmayer L. J., Kitayama S., Worthman C. M., Lemelson R. & Cummings C. A. (eds.) Culture, mind, and brain: Emerging concepts, models, applications. Cambridge University Press, New York NY. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Høffding S. (2015) A phenomenology of expert musicianship. PhD thesis, Department of Philosophy, University of Copenhagen, Copenhagen. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Ilundáin-Agurruza J. (2016) Holism and the cultivation of excellence in sports and performance. Routledge, London. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
James W. (1950) Principles of Psychology. Dover, New York. Originally published in 1890. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Johnson S. C. (2000) The recognition of mentalistic agents in infancy. Trends in Cognitive Science 4(1): 22–28. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Johnson S., Slaughter V. & Carey S. (1998) Whose gaze will infants follow? The elicitation of gaze-following in 12-month-old infants. Developmental Science 1(2): 233–238. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Jones P. H. (2009) Introducing neuroeducational research: Neuroscience, education and the brain from contexts to practice. Routledge, London. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Jones S. S. (2006) Exploration or imitation? The effect of music on 4-week-old infants’ tongue protrusions. Infant Behavior and Development 29(1): 126–130. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Jones S. S. (2009) The development of imitation in infancy. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London B: Biological Sciences 364(1528): 2325–2335. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Kant I. (1996) Practical philosophy. Edited and translated by M. J. Gregor. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Keven N. & Akins K. A. (2017) Neonatal imitation in context: Sensory-motor development in the perinatal period. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 40: E381. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Kircher T. T. J., Senior C., Phillips M. L., Benson P. J., Bullmore E. T., Brammer M., Simmons A., Williams S. C. R., Bartels M. & David A. S. (2000) Towards a functional neuroanatomy of self processing: Effects of faces and words. Cognitive Brain Research 10: 133–144. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Lakoff G. & Johnson M. (1999) Philosophy in the flesh: The embodied mind and its challenge to western thought. Basic Books, New York. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Lee S. E., VanderPloeg A. & Strifler J. (2016) The neurocentric view on consumers of cotton: An application of consumer neuroscience. In: Proceedings of the ITAA Annual Conference. Annual Conference Proceedings #73. Iowa State University Digital Repository: 1–2. https://lib.dr.iastate.edu/itaa_proceedings/2016/presentations/98.
Legerstee M. (1991) The role of person and object in eliciting early imitation. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology 51(3): 423–33. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Legrand D. & Ruby P. (2009) What is self specific? A theoretical investigation and a critical review of neuroimaging results. Psychological Review 116(1): 252–282. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Libet B. (1985) Unconscious cerebral initiative and the role of conscious will in voluntary action. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 8: 529–566. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Libet B. (1992) The neural time-factor in perception, volition, and free will. Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 2: 255–272. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Limanowski J. & Blankenburg F. (2013) Minimal self-models and the free energy principle. Frontiers in human neuroscience 7: 547. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Lou H. C., Luber B., Crupain M., Keenan J. P., Nowak M., Kjaer T. W., Sackeim H. A. & Lisanby S. H. (2004) Parietal cortex and representation of the mental self. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences USA 101: 6827–6832. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Mackenzie C. & Stoljar N. (2000) Introduction: Autonomy refigured. In: Mackenzie C. & Stoljar N. (eds.) Relational autonomy: Feminist perspectives on autonomy, agency, and the social self. Oxford University Press, Oxford: 3–31. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Malafouris L. (2013) How things shape the mind. MIT Press, Cambridge MA. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Malafouris L. (2015) Metaplasticity and the primacy of material engagement. Time and Mind 8(4): 351–371. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Maurer D. & Barrera M. E. (1981) Infants’ perception of natural and distorted arrangements of a schematic face. Child Development 52(1): 196–202. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Mead G. H. (1913) The social self. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods 10(14): 374–380. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Meltzoff A. & Moore M. K. (1994) Imitation, memory, and the representation of persons, Infant Behavior and Development 17: 83–99. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Meltzoff A. N. & Moore M. K. (1977) Imitation of facial and manual gestures by human neonates. Science 198(4312): 75–78. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Merleau-Ponty M. (2003) Nature: Course notes from the College de France, ed. R. Vallier. Northwestern University Press, Evanston. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Metzinger T. (2004) Being no one: The self-model theory of subjectivity. MIT Press, Cambridge. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Moutoussis M., Fearon P., El-Deredy W., Dolan R. J. & Friston K. J. (2014) Bayesian inferences about the self (and others): A review. Consciousness and Cognition 25: 67–76. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Nagy E., Pal A. & Orvos H. (2014) Learning to imitate individual finger movements by the human neonate. Developmental Science 17: 841–57. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Nagy E., Pilling K., Orvos H. & Molnar P. (2013) Imitation of tongue protrusion in human neonates: Specificity of the response in a large sample. Developmental Psychology 49(9): 1628. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Naumann R. (2016) Dynamics in the brain and dynamic frame theory for action verbs. In: Brunel L., Versace R. & Brouillet D. (eds.) The sensory nature of knowledge. Proceedings of the SMCLC-11. Düsseldorf University Press, Düsseldorf: 109–130. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Neisser U. (1988) Five kinds of self-knowledge. Philosophical Psychology 1: 35–59. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Newen A., Welpinghus A. & Juckel G. (2015) Emotion recognition as pattern recognition: The relevance of perception. Mind & Language 30(2): 187–208. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Noë A. (2004) Action in perception. MIT Press, Cambridge MA. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Northoff G. & Bermpohl F. (2004) Cortical midline structures and the self. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 8: 102–107. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Northoff G. & Panksepp J. (2008) The trans-species concept of self and the subcortical–cortical midline system. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 12(7): 259–264. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Northoff G., Heinzel A., de Greck M., Bennpohl F., Dobrowolny H. & Panksepp J. (2006) Self-referential processing in our brain: A meta-analysis of imaging studies on the self. Neuroimage 31: 440–457. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
O’Regan J. K. & Noë A. (2001) A sensorimotor account of vision and visual consciousness. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24(5): 939–973 http://cepa.info/2285
Platek S. M., Myers T. E., Critton S. R. & Gallup G. G. (2003) A left-hand advantage for self-description: The impact of schizotypal personality traits. Schizophrenia Research 65: 147–151. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Popper K. R. & Eccles J. C. (1977) The self and its brain: An argument for interactionism. Springer International, New York. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Postle N., McMahon K. L., Ashton R., Meredith M. & de Zubicaray G. I. (2008) Action word meaning representations in cyto-architectonically defined primary and premotor cortex. Neuroimage 43: 634–644. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Pulvermüller F. (2005) Brain mechanisms linking language and action. Nature Reviews Neuroscience 6: 576–582. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Purves D. (1988) Body and brain: A trophic theory of neural connections. Harvard University Press, Cambridge MA. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Ramstead M. J. D., Badcock P. B. & Friston K. J. (2018) Answering Schrödinger’s question: A free-energy formulation. Physics of Life Review 24: 1–16. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Reddy V. (2008) How infants know minds. Harvard University Press, Cambridge MA. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Rizzolatti G., Fadiga L., Gallese V. & Fogassi L. (1996) Premotor cortex and the recognition of motor actions. Cognitive Brain Research 3(2): 131–141. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Rochat P. (2011) What is it like to be a newborn. In: Gallagher S. (ed.) The Oxford handbook of the self. Oxford University Press, Oxford: 57–79. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Röhricht F., Gallagher S., Geuter U. & Hutto D. D. (2014) Embodied cognition and body psychotherapy: The construction of new therapeutic environments. Sensoria: A Journal of Mind, Brain & Culture 10(1): 11–20. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Ruby P., Collette F., D’Argembeau A., Peters F., Degueldre C., Balteau E., Luxen A., Maquet P., Salmon E. (2009) Perspective taking to assess self-personality: What’s modified in Alzheimer’s disease? Neurobiology of Aging 30: 1637–1651. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Schechtman M. (2011) The narrative self. In: Gallagher S. (ed.) The Oxford handbook of the self. Oxford University Press, Oxford: 394–416. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Searle J. R. (1983) Intentionality: An essay in the philosophy of mind. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Seth A. K. (2013) Interoceptive inference, emotion, and the embodied self. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 17(11): 565–573 http://cepa.info/4518
Seth A. K., Suzuki K. & Critchley H. D. (2011) An interoceptive predictive coding model of conscious presence. Frontiers in Psychology 2: 395. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Shelley B. P. (2013) Brain wellbeing and brain-healthy lifestyle in the neurocentric age. Archives of Medicine and Heath Sciences 1(2): 99–102. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Strawson G. (1999) The self. In: Gallagher S. & Shear J. (eds.) Models of the self. Imprint Academic, Exeter: 1–24. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Sutton J. (2010) Exograms and interdisciplinarity: History, the extended mind and the civilizing process. In: Menary R. (ed.) The extended mind. MIT Press, Cambridge MA: 189–225. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Taylor C. (1989) Sources of the self: The making of the modern identity. Harvard University Press, Cambridge MA. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Thompson E. & Stapleton M. (2009) Making sense of sense-making: Reflections on enactive and extended mind theories. Topoi 28(1): 23–30 http://cepa.info/2290
Thompson E. (2007) Mind in life: Biology, phenomenology, and the sciences of mind. Harvard University Press, Cambridge MA http://constructivist.info/3/2/117
Titley H. K., Brunel N. & Hansel C. (2017) Toward a neurocentric view of learning. Neuron 95(1): 19–32. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Tollefsen D. & Gallagher S. (2017) We-narratives and the stability and depth of shared agency. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 47(2): 95–110. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Trevarthen C. (1979) Communication and cooperation in early infancy: A description of primary intersubjectivity. In: Bullowa M. (ed.) Before Speech: The Beginning of Interpersonal Communication. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Trevarthen C. (1999) Musicality and the intrinsic motive pulse: Evidence from human psychobiology and infant communication. Musicae scientiae 3(1 suppl): 155–215. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Trevarthen C., Aitken K. J., Nagy E., Delafield-Butt J. T. & Vandekerckhove M. (2006) Collaborative regulations of vitality in early childhood: Stress in intimate relationships and postnatal psychopathology. In: Cicchetti D. & Cohen D. J. (ed.) Developmental Psychopathology. John Wiley and Sons, New York: 65–126. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Turk D. J., Heatherton T. F., Macrae C. N., Kelley W. M. & Gazzaniga M. S. (2003) Out of contact, out of mind: The distributed nature of the self. Annals of the New York Academy of Science 1001: 65–78. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Velleman J. D. (2005) Self as narrator. In: Christman J. & Anderson J. (eds.) Autonomy and the challenges to liberalism: New Essays. Cambridge University Press, New York: 56–76. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Vincini S. & Jhang Y. (2018) Association but not recognition: An alternative model for differential imitation from 0 to 2 months. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 9(2): 395–427. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Vincini S., Jhang Y., Buder E. H. & Gallagher S. (2017) An unsettled debate: Key empirical and theoretical questions are still open (Commentary on Keven and Akins) Behavioral and Brain Sciences 40: E401. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Vincini S., Jhang Y., Buder E. H. & Gallagher S. (2017) Neonatal imitation: Theory, experimental design and significance for the field of social cognition. Frontiers in Psychology – Cognitive Science 8: 1323. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Vogeley K. & Gallagher S. (2011) The self in the brain. In: Gallagher S. (ed.) The Oxford handbook of the self. Oxford University Press, Oxford: 111–136. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Walker A. S. (1982) Intermodal perception of expressive behaviors by human infants. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology 33(3): 514–35. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Weizsäcker V. von. (1986) Der Gestaltkreis: Theorie der Einheit von Wahrnehmen und Bewegen. Fifth edition. Thieme, Stuttgart. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Willems R. M., Toni I., Hagoort P. & Casasanto D. (2009) Neural dissociations between action verb understanding and motor imagery. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience 22: 2387–2400. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Woodward A. L. & Sommerville J. A. (2000) Twelve-month-old infants interpret action in context. Psychological Science 11: 73–77. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar

Comments: 0

To stay informed about comments to this publication and post comments yourself, please log in first.