Volume 3 · Number 1 · Pages 30–37
Brain in Mind: The Mind–Brain Relation with the Mind at the Center

Herbert F. J. Müller

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Abstract

Purpose: To show that the mind–brain relation can be understood from a perspective that keeps the mind at the center. Problem: Since at least the time of Augustine, the puzzle of the mind–brain relation has been how the mind is attached to, or originates from, the body or brain. This is still the prevalent scientific question. It implies assumption of a primary (ontological) subject–object split, and furthermore that subjective experience can be derived from, or even reduced to, a fictitious mind-independently pre-structured reality. This belief in mind-independent reality is closely related to the development and use of language. It in turn means that the mind cannot be real because it cannot be mind-independent and so disappears from discussion, preventing access to the mind–brain question. Solution: The problem requires an epistemology which keeps subjective experience at the center but does not interfere with objective methods. The un-testable proposition of mind-independent structures can be re-formulated as the use of templates for thinking: a method created by humans, a knowable tool, that is, “working” or “as-if” ontology-metaphysics. Truth and reality, including the reality of objective brain activity, then become working tools within ongoing subject-inclusive encompassing experience. Conclusion: The traditional mind–brain puzzle is the result of erroneous premises, and can be replaced by the question: how does working-objective knowledge originate within encompassing experience? This is a novel and contradiction-free approach to studies of the mind–brain relation and related questions.

Key words: mind/brain, zero-derivation structuring, subject/object, working ontology, metaphysics

Citation

Müller H. F. J. (2007) Brain in mind: The mind–brain relation with the mind at the center. Constructivist Foundations 3(1): 30–37. http://constructivist.info/3/1/030

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