Volume 11 · Number 2 · Pages 425–427
Enactive Consciousness and Gendlin’s Dream Analysis

Ralph D. Ellis

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Open peer commentary on the article “Exploring the Depth of Dream Experience: The Enactive Framework and Methods for Neurophenomenological Research” by Elizaveta Solomonova & Xin Wei Sha. Upshot: A neurophenomenological approach to the enactive account of consciousness in general is supported by an account of how the brain functions in creating imagery of non-present objects and situations. Three types of non-sensory imagery are needed to ground our consciousness of sensory imagery: proprioceptive imagery, motor imagery, and what Eugene Gendlin calls the “felt sense” of a situation. Dreams show clearly how we image situations without sensory input, a process that is clearly enactive rather than reactive. This enactive account of imagery then supports Gendlin’s method of interpreting dreams by comparing their “felt sense” to the felt sense of waking situations.


Ellis R. D. (2016) Enactive consciousness and gendlin’s dream analysis. Constructivist Foundations 11(2): 425–427. http://constructivist.info/11/2/425

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