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Open peer commentary on the article “Consciousness as Self-Description in Differences” by Diana Gasparyan. Upshot: I focus on Gasparyan’s claim that consciousness should be understood analogously to the performative speech acts. I am inclined to agree with her position, but shall, at the same time, try to show that there is no need to maintain a relational character of consciousness, where the relation would be taking place between an act of consciousness and its content. A non-relational character of consciousness could be - according to my view - based upon a modal nature of consciousness and mental states, conceived on the model of sensory modalities.
Schetz A. (2016) The non-relationality of consciousness. Constructivist Foundations 11(3): 562–564. http://constructivist.info/11/3/562
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