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Abstract
Upshot: The central issue of Consciousness in the Physical World is Russellian monism, which claims that consciousness could be ontologically reduced to intrinsic properties of physical objects. In contemporary discussions, Russellian monism is more broadly defined than Russell’s original version of neutral monism, and it even becomes a family of views. In this review, based on two major distinctions between Russellian monism and Russell’s neutral monism, we point out that these current re-interpretations not only extend Russell’s theory; some may also put a heavy metaphysical burden on Russell’s construction of matter from experience.
Citation
Hengwei L. & Da D. (2016) Russellian monism: The heritage of Russell’s construction of matter from experience – review of consciousness in the physical world: Perspectives on Russellian monism. Constructivist Foundations 12(1): 126–129. http://constructivist.info/12/1/126
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