Volume 12 · Number 2 ·
Pages 131–138
Building a Science of Experience: Neurophenomenology and Related Disciplines
Camila Valenzuela-Moguillansky, Alejandra Vásquez-Rosati & Alexander Riegler
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Abstract
Context: More than 20 years ago Varela initiated a research program to advance in the scientific study of consciousness, neurophenomenology. Problem: Has Varela’s neurophenomenology, the solution to the “hard problem,” been successful? Which issues remain unresolved, and why? Method: This introduction sketches the progress that has been made since then and links it to the contributions to this special issue. Results: Instead of a unified research field, today we find a variety of different interpretations and implementations of neurophenomenology. We argue that neurophenomenology needs to give additional attention to its experiential dimension by addressing first-person methods’ specific challenges and by rethinking the relationship between the frameworks of the firstand third-person approaches.
Citation
Valenzuela-Moguillansky C., Vásquez-Rosati A. & Riegler A. (2017) Building a science of experience: Neurophenomenology and related disciplines. Constructivist Foundations 12(2): 131–138. http://constructivist.info/12/2/131
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| Comment by Michael Zeldich · 22 Mar 2017 | |
| I am sorry for the disturbing question, but study of consciousness should be started from answer on the question about existence of such phenomena. The second problem is in believes that our experience is consisting information about real world objects and events. That is required an answer on the simple question: “How information about the real world is delivered to a brain?†I know that obtaining correct answers on these questions will lead to creation of artificial subjective systems and would like to give the danger warning: “No one should create of an artificial subjective system capable to have its own egoistic interests. There will be no place for human race, if that precautionary measure will be not obeyedâ€. | |