Log in download the full text in PDF
Open peer commentary on the article “Enaction as a Lived Experience: Towards a Radical Neurophenomenology” by Claire Petitmengin. Upshot: I reflect and expand upon three aspects of Petitmengin’s illuminating article. After (a) contrasting existential (Petitmengin) and theoretical (Kirchhoff and Hutto) views of neurophenomenology, I (b) embed Petitmengin’s account of the experiential dissolution of the hard problem of consciousness into a larger framework by drawing parallels with previous experiments on unitive/non-dual experiences (Deikman). Finally, I (c) raise the question of how seriously we are willing to take the pragmatics of investigating and cultivating lived experience both in phenomenological research and in education and science in general.
Vörös S. (2017) Enacting enaction: Conceptual nest or existential mutation? Constructivist Foundations 12(2): 148–150. http://constructivist.info/12/2/148
To stay informed about comments to this publication and post comments yourself, please log in first.