Volume 12 · Number 2 ·
Pages 190–203
A First-Person Analysis Using Third-Person Data as a Generative Method: A Case Study of Surprise in Depression
Natalie Depraz, Maria Gyemant & Thomas Desmidt
Log in to download the full text for free
Abstract
Context: The use of first-person micro-phenomenological interviews and their productive interaction with third-person physiological data is a challenging and pressing issue in order to offer an effective and fruitful application of Varela’s neurophenomenological hypothesis. Problem: We aim at offering a generative method of analysis of first-person micro-phenomenological interviews using third-person physiological data. Our challenge is to describe this generative first-person analysis with the third-person physiological framework rather than put Varela’s hypothesis into practice in a generative way (as we did in another paper. Method: The present contribution is a first pioneering study as far as the exposition of such an interactive generative methodology is concerned. It is also a new issue insofar as it deals with a case study, surprise in depression, that has not been thoroughly dealt with so far, either in philosophy or in psychopathology. Results: We show that the analysis of first-person data is an intrinsic generative one, insofar as new refined categories and multifarious circular micro- and macro-processes were discovered in the very process of analyzing. They provide the initial structural generic third-person description of surprise inherited both from philosophical phenomenological a priori categories and from the experimental startle setting with a refined micro-segmentation of the dynamic of the experience. Implications: Our article could be of interest to neurophenomenologists looking for an effective application and to researchers in quest of a method of analysis of first-person data. The present limitations are due to the still preliminary data-results we need to complete. Constructivist content: The article is directly linked to Varela’s neurophenomenological program and aims at extending and reforming it with a cardio-phenomenological approach. Keywords: First-person micro-phenomenological interviews, surprise, generative analysis of first-person data, depression, cardio-phenomenology, generative categories.
Citation
Depraz N., Gyemant M. & Desmidt T. (2017) A first-person analysis using third-person data as a generative method: A case study of surprise in depression. Constructivist Foundations 12(2): 190–203. http://constructivist.info/12/2/190
Export article citation data: Plain Text · BibTex · EndNote · Reference Manager (RIS)
References
Bayne T. (2004) Closing the gap? Some questions for neurophenomenology. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 3: 349–364 http://cepa.info/2260
Beaton M. (2013) Phenomenology and embodied action. Constructivist Foundations 8(3): 298–313 http://constructivist.info/8/3/298
Bitbol M. & Antonova E. (2016) On the too often overlooked radicality of neurophenomenology. Constructivist Foundations 11(2): 359–361 http://constructivist.info/11/2/359
Bitbol M. (2002) Science as if situation mattered. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 1(2): 181–224. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Bitbol M. (2012) Neurophenomenology, an ongoing practice of/in consciousness. Constructivist Foundations 7(3): 165–173 http://constructivist.info/7/3/165
Chalmers D. (1996) The conscious mind: In search of a fundamental theory. Oxford University Press, New York. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Churchland P. S. (1994) Can neurobiology teach us anything about consciousness? Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 67(4): 23–40. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Colombetti G. (2014) The feeling body: Affective science meets the enactive mind. MIT Press, Cambridge MA http://cepa.info/777
Craig D. (2009) Emotional moments across time: A possible neural basis for time perception in the anterior insula. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological Sciences 364(1525): 1933–1942. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Dennett D. (1991) Consciousness explained. Little, Brown and Co, Boston. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Depraz N. & Celle A. (eds.) (2017) Surprise at the intersection between phenomenology and linguistics. John Benjamins Press, Boston, in press. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Depraz N. & Desmidt T. (2015) Cardiophénoménologie. Cahiers Philosophiques de Strasbourg 38: 47–85. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Depraz N. & Desmidt T. (2017) Cardiophenomenology: An extension of neurophenomenology. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, under revision. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Depraz N. & Serban C. (eds.) (2015) La surprise à l’épreuve des langues. Hermann, Paris. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Depraz N. (1995) Transcendance et incarnation. L’intersubjectivité comme altérité à soi chez Husserl. Vrin, Paris. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Depraz N. (1999) When transcendantal genesis encounters the naturalization project. In: Petitot J., Pachoud B., Varela F. J. & Roy J.-M. (eds.) Naturalizing phenomenology: Issues in contemporary phenomenology and cognitive science. Stanford University Press, Stanford: 464–489. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Depraz N. (2001) Lucidité du corps: Pour un empirisme transcendantal en phénoménologie. Kluwer, Dordrecht. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Depraz N. (2002) Confronting death before death: Between imminence and unpredictability. Francisco Varela’s neurophenomenology of radical embodiment. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 1(2): 83–95. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Depraz N. (2004) Le tournant pratique de la phénoménologie. Revue Philosophique de la France et de l’Étranger 129(2): 149–165. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Depraz N. (2014) The surprise of non-sense. In: Cappuccio M. & Froese T. (eds.) Enactive cognition at the edge of sense-making: Making sense of non-sense. Palgrave-Macmillan, New York: 125–152. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Depraz N. (2015) La surprise. Une dynamique circulaire de verbalisation multivectorielle. In: Depraz N. & Serban C. (eds.) La surprise à l’épreuve des langues. Hermann, Paris: 21–43. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Depraz N. (2017) Shock, twofold dynamics, cascade: Three signatures of surprise: The micro-time of the surprised body. In: Depraz N. & Celle A. (eds.) Surprise at the Intersection Between Phenomenology and Linguistics. John Benjamins Press, Boston, in press. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Depraz N. (2017) Surprise, valence, emotion. The multivectorial integrative cardio-phenomenology of surprise. In: Depraz N. & Steinbock A. (eds.) Surprise, an Emotion? Springer, Heidelberg, in press. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Depraz N., Varela F. J. & Vermersch P. (2003) On becoming aware: A pragmatics of experiencing. John Benjamins, Amsterdam. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Desmidt T., Lemoine M., Belzung C. & Depraz N. (2014) The temporal dynamic of emotional emergence. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 13(4): 557–578. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Dickinson A. & Balleine B. (2010) Hedonics: The cognitive-motivational interface. In: M. L. Kringelbach & K. C. Berridge (eds.) Pleasures of the brain. Oxford University Press, New York: 74–84. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Dodou D. & de Winter J. C. F. (2014) Social desirability is the same in offline, online, and paper surveys: A meta-analysis. Computers in Human Behavior 36: 487–495. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Gallagher S. & Zahavi D. (2012) The phenomenological mind. Routledge, London. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Gendlin E. (1982) Focusing. Bantam Books, Westminster ML. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Giorgi A. (2009) The descriptive phenomenological method in psychology: A modified Husserlian approach. Duquesne University Press, Pittsburgh PA. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Gregory R. (1997) Knowledge in perception and illusion. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B 352: 1121–1128. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Heavey C. L., Hurlburt R. T. & Lefforge N. L. (2012) Toward a phenomenology of feelings. Emotion 12(4): 763–777. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Helmholtz H. von (2000) Concerning the perceptions in general. In: Yantis S. (ed.) Visual perception: Essential readings. Psychology Press, Philadelphia PA: 24–44. German original published in 1866. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Hurlburt R. & Schwitzgebel E. (2007) Describing inner experience: Proponent meets skeptic. MIT Press, Cambridge MA. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Hurlburt R. T., Alderson-Day B., Kühn S. & Fernyhough C. (2016) Exploring the ecological validity of thinking on demand: Neural Correlates of Elicited vs. Spontaneously Occurring Inner Speech. PLoS ONE 11(2): E0147932. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Husserl E. (1970) The crisis of the European sciences and transcendental philosophy. Northwestern University Press, Evanston IL. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Husserl E. (1973) Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität. Husserliana XIII-XIV-XV. Erster Teil. 1905–1920, Zweiter Teil. 1921–28, Dritter Teil. 1929–35, edited by Iso Kern. Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague. French translation by N. Depraz published in 2011 as: Textes sur l’intersubjectivité. 2 volumes. PUF, Paris. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Husserl E. (1982) Ideas pertaining to a pure phenomenology and to a phenomenological philosophy: First book, Dordrecht: Kluwer. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Husserl E. (1989) Ideas pertaining to a pure phenomenology and to a phenomenological philosophy: Second book. Kluwer, Dordrecht. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Husserl E. (1991) On the phenomenology of the consciousness of internal time (1893–1917) Kluwer, Dordrecht. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Husserl E. (2005) Wahrnehmung und Aufmerksamkeit (1893–1912) Husserliana XXXVIII, edited by Thomas Vongehr and Regula Giuliani. Springer, New York. French translation by N. Depraz: Phénoménologie de l’attention. Vrin, Paris, 2009. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Johansson P., Hall L., Sikström S. & Olsson A. (2005) Failure to detect mismatches between intention and outcome in a simple decision task. Science 310(5745): 116–119. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Kirchhoff M. D. & Hutto D. D. (2016) Never mind the gap: Neurophenomenology, radical enactivism, and the hard problem of consciousness. Constructivist Foundations 11(2): 346–353 http://constructivist.info/11/2/346
Kool W., Getz S. J. & Botvinick M. M. (2013) Neural representation of reward probability: Evidence from the illusion of control. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience 25(6): 852–861. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Kordeš U. (2016) Going beyond theory: Constructivism and empirical phenomenology. Constructivist Foundations 11(2): 375–385 http://constructivist.info/11/2/375
Langer E. J. (1975) The illusion of control. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 32(2) 311. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Levine J. (1983) Materialism and qualia: The explanatory gap. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 64(4: 354–361 http://cepa.info/4061
Lutz A., Lachaux J.-P., Martinerie J. & Varela F. J. (2002) Guiding the study of brain dynamics by using first-person data: Synchrony patterns correlate with ongoing conscious states during a simple visual task. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 99: 1586–1591 http://cepa.info/2092
Mackenzie M. J., Carlson L. E., Paskevich D. M., Ekkekakis P., Wurz A. J., Wytsma K., Krenz K. A., McAuley E. & Culos-Reed S. N. (2014) Associations between attention, affect and cardiac activity in a single yoga session for female cancer survivors: An enactive neurophenomenology-based approach. Consciousness and Cognition 27: 129–146. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Merleau-Ponty M. & Bannan J. F. (1956) What is phenomenology? CrossCurrents 6(1): 59–70. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Merleau-Ponty M. (2013) Phenomenology of perception. Abingdon, Oxon. French original published in 1945. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Nisbett R. E. & Wilson T. D. (1977) Telling more than one can know: Verbal reports on mental processes. Psychological Review 84: 231–259. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Olivares F. A., Vargas E., Fuentes C., Martínez-Pernía D. & Canales-Johnson A. (2015) Neurophenomenology revisited: Second-person methods for the study of human consciousness. Frontiers in Psychology 6: 673. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Petit J.-L. (2015) Présentation. Les Cahiers Philosophiques de Strasbourg 38: 9–16. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Petitmengin C. (2001) L’expérience intuitive. L’Harmattan, Paris. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Petitmengin C. (2006) Describing one’s subjective experience in the second person: An interview method for a science of consciousness. Phenomenology and the Cognitive sciences 5(3): 229–269 http://cepa.info/2376
Petitmengin C. (ed.) (2009) Ten years of viewing from within: The legacy of Francisco Varela. Imprint Acadamic, Exeter. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Petitot J., Varela F. J., Pachoud B. & Roy J.-M. (eds.) (1999) Naturalizing phenomenology: Issues in contemporary phenomenology and cognitive science. Stanford University Press, Stanford. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Pierce B. (2012) Is the function of consciousness to act as an interface? In: Paglieri F. (ed.) Consciousness in interaction. John Benjamins, Amsterdam: 73–88. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Price D. D. & Barrell J. J. (2012) Inner experience and neuroscience: Merging both perspectives. MIT Press, Cambridge MA. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Pronin E. & Kugler M. B. (2007) Valuing thoughts, ignoring behavior: The introspection illusion as a source of the bias blind spot. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 43(4): 565–578. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Smedslund J. (1997) The structure of psychological common sense. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, New Jersey. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Smith J. (2005) Merleau‐Ponty and the phenomenological reduction. Inquiry: A Journal of Medical Care Organization, Provision and Financing 48(6): 553–571. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Strle T. (2016) Embodied, enacted and experienced decision-making. Phainomena XXV (98–99): 83–107 http://cepa.info/4038
Strle T. (2016) On the necessity of foundations, intersubjectivity and cognitive science. Constructivist Foundations 11(2): 387–389 http://constructivist.info/11/2/387
Thompson E. & Varela F. J. (2001) Radical embodiment: Neural dynamics and consciousness. Trends in Cognitive Science 5(1): 418–425 http://cepa.info/2085
Thompson E. & Zahavi D. (2007) Phenomenology. In: Zelazo P. D., Moscovitch M. & Thompson E. (eds.) The Cambridge handbook of consciousness. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge: 67–87. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Titchener E. B. (1898) The postulates of a structural psychology. The Philosophical Review 7(5): 449–465. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Varela F. J. (1996) Neurophenomenology: A methodological remedy for the hard problem. Journal of Consciousness Studies 3(4): 330–349 http://cepa.info/1893
Varela F. J. (1999) The specious present: A neurophenomenology of time consciousness. In: Petitot J. & al. (eds.) Naturalizing phenomenology: Issues in contemporary phenomenology and cognitive science. Stanford University Press, Stanford CA: 266–317 http://cepa.info/2081
Varela F. J., Thompson E. & Rosch E. (1991) The embodied mind: Cognitive science and human experience. MIT Press, Cambridge MA. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Velmans M. (2009) Understanding consciousness. Second edition. Routledge/Psychology Press. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Vermersch P. (1994) L’entretien d’explicitation en formation initiale et en formation continue. Paris, ESF. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Vermersch P. (2004) Aide à l’explicitation et retour réflexif. Education Permanente 160: 71–80. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Vermersch P. (2009) Describing the practice of introspection. Journal of Consciousness Studies 16(10–12): 20–57 http://cepa.info/2416
Vermersch P. (2014) L’entretien d’explicitation. Issy-les-Moulineaux. ESF, Paris. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Vörös S. (2014) The uroboros of consciousness: Between the naturalisation of phenomenology and the phenomenologisation of nature. Constructivist Foundations 10(1): 96–104 http://constructivist.info/10/1/096
Zahavi D. (2004) Phenomenology and the project of naturalization. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 3: 331–347 http://cepa.info/2375
Zahavi D. (2010) Naturalized phenomenology. In: Schmicking D. & Gallagher S. (eds.) Handbook of phenomenology and cognitive science. Springer, Berlin: 3–19. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Comments: 0
To stay informed about comments to this publication and post comments yourself, please log in first.