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Volume 13 · Number 1 · Pages 103–105
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Life is Intrinsically Temporal

Julian Kiverstein

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Abstract

Open peer commentary on the article “The Past, Present and Future of Time-Consciousness: From Husserl to Varela and Beyond” by Shaun Gallagher. Upshot: In this commentary I invert Gallagher’s argument and argue that the account he gives of temporality should be applied to enactive cognition across the board. Instead of enactivising phenomenological accounts of time-consciousness, I suggest Gallagher ought also to be read as arguing for a temporalizing of enactive cognition.

Citation

Kiverstein J. (2017) Life is intrinsically temporal. Constructivist Foundations 13(1): 103–105. http://constructivist.info/13/1/103

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References

Chemero A. (2009) Radical embodied cognitive science. MIT Press, Cambridge MA. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Clark A. (2008) Supersizing the mind: Embodiment, action and cognitive extension. Oxford University Press, Oxford. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Gallagher S. (2017) Enactivist interventions: Rethinking the mind. Oxford University Press: Oxford. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Husserl E. (2001) Die Bernauer Manuskripte über das Zeitbewusstsein (1917–18) Husserliana 33. Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Rietveld E. & Kiverstein J. (2014) A rich landscape of affordances. Ecological Psychology 26(4): 325–52. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Varela F. J. & Depraz N. (2005) At the source of time: Valence and the constitutional dynamics of affect. Journal of Consciousness Studies 12(8–10): 61–81. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
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Varela F. J. (1999) The specious present: A neurophenomenology of time consciousness. In: Petitot J., Varela F. J., Pachoud B. & Roy J.-M. (eds.) Naturalizing phenomenology: Issues in contemporary phenomenology and cognitive science. Stanford University Press, Stanford: 266–329. http://cepa.info/2081

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