Abstract
Open peer commentary on the article “Decentering the Brain: Embodied Cognition and the Critique of Neurocentrism and Narrow-Minded Philosophy of Mind” by Shaun Gallagher. Abstract: In this commentary I suggest that the “E-approaches” advocated by Gallagher should move a step further, beyond the negative critiques that they address to the classical (representationalist and neurocentered) framework in cognitive science. If these approaches do not want to look like a “decapitated program,” neglecting the rational dimension of our experience, more should be said about our higher-level capacities and their perceptual and pragmatic foundation.
Citation
Bimbenet (2018) A decapitated program? Constructivist Foundations 14(1): 25–27. http://constructivist.info/14/1/025
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References
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