Volume 14 · Number 2 · Pages 221–224
Subjective Experiences are Relational: Implications for Trauma Research and Therapy

Anna Ciaunica

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Abstract

Open peer commentary on the article “Applying the Neurophenomenological Approach to the Study of Trauma: Theory and Practice Yochai Ataria, Mooli Lahad & Omer Horovitz The Study of Trauma” by Yochai Ataria, Mooli Lahad & Omer Horovitz. Abstract: While I applaud Ataria and colleagues’ emphasis on the importance of “returning” to the phenomenology of disrupted subjective experiences, here I draw attention to the importance of second-person body-based dynamic engagements with others in bridging the gap between first- and third-person approaches in understanding traumatic experiences. To put it in a provocative slogan: the second person comes first. I will conclude by briefly outlining some implications for therapeutic interventions based on dynamic body-based engagements with others complementing the static, interview-based approaches.

Citation

Ciaunica A. (2019) Subjective experiences are relational: Implications for trauma research and therapy. Constructivist Foundations 14(2): 221–224. https://constructivist.info/14/2/221

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