Précis of The Philosophy of Affordances
Manuel Heras-Escribano
Log in to download the full text for free
> Citation
> Similar
> References
> Add Comment
Abstract
Context: Affordances are gaining momentum as a key object of study in the cognitive sciences and the philosophy of mind. In The Philosophy of Affordances I propose a new way to understand affordances that avoids some philosophical problems that have been overlooked in the literature. Problem: I summarize two of the problems and discussions that are analyzed in the book: first, the ontological characterization of affordances; second, the alleged normative character of affordances. Method: I apply a conceptual analysis of the main philosophical implications that result from understanding affordances as grounded on the principles of the ecological approach. Results: I propose a dispositional approach to affordances based on a Rylean, non-reductive perspective that avoids both the hidden Platonic commitment of dispositionalism and the alleged normative character attributed to affordances. Implications: Affordances can be understood as dispositional properties from a non-reductive or Rylean perspective, which helps preclude some key problems related to the ontological status of these scientific entities. Constructivist content: Affordances do not imply mental construction; they refer to a new way in which we can describe the reciprocity between organism and environment while avoiding dualizing terms. Keywords: Affordance, agency, ecological information, enactivism, disposition, James J. Gibson, normativity, phenomenology, Gilbert Ryle.
Handling Editor: Alexander Riegler
Citation
Heras-Escribano M. (2020) Précis of the philosophy of affordances. Constructivist Foundations 15(3): 199–213. https://constructivist.info/15/3/199
Export article citation data:
Plain Text ·
BibTex ·
EndNote ·
Reference Manager (RIS)
References
Caligiore D., Borghi A. M., Parisi D. & Baldassarre G. (2009) Affordances and compatibility effects: A neural-network computational model. In: Mayor J., Ruh N. & Plunkett K. (eds.) Connectionist models of behaviour and cognition II: Proceedings of the Eleventh Neural Computation and Psychology Workshop, University of Oxford, UK, 16–18 July 2008. World Scientific, Singapore: 15–26.
▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Dretske F. (2000) Perception, knowledge, and belief: Selected essays. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Dreyfus H. L. & Kelly S. D. (2007) Heterophenomenology: Heavy-handed sleight-of-hand. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6(1–2): 45–55.
▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Dreyfus H. L. (2014) Skillful coping: Essays on the phenomenology of everyday perception and action. Edited by Mark Wrathall. Oxford University Press, Oxford.
▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Franzoni V., Milani A. & Vallverdú J. (2017) Emotional affordances in human-machine interactive planning and negotiation. In: Proceedings 2017 IEEE/WIC/ACM International Conference on Web Intelligence, WI 2017, 23–26 August 2017, Leipzig Germany. ACM, New York: 924–930.
https://dl.acm.org/doi/pdf/10.1145/3106426.3109421
Gibson E. J. (1994) Has psychology a future? Psychological Science 5(2): 69–76.
▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Gibson J. J. (1967) James J. Gibson. In: Boring E. G. & Lindzey G. (eds.) The century psychology series: A history of psychology in autobiography. Volume 5. East Appleton-Century-Crofts, Norwalk CT: 127–143.
▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Gibson J. J. (1977) The theory of affordances. In: Shaw R. & Bransford J. (eds.) Perceiving, acting, and knowing: Toward an ecological psychology. Lawrence Erlbaum, Hillsdale NJ: 67–82.
▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Heft H. (1981) An examination of constructivist and Gibsonian approaches to environmental psychology. Population and Environment 4(4): 227–245.
▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Heft H. (2001) Ecological psychology in context: James Gibson, Roger Barker, and the legacy of William James’ radical empiricism. Houghton-Mifflin, Boston.
▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
James W. (1981) The principles of psychology. Harvard University Press, Cambridge. Originally published in 1890.
▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Marx K. (1969) Thesen über Feuerbach. In: Marx-Engels Werke. Volume 3. Dietz, Berlin.
▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
McDowell J. (2009) The engaged intellect: Philosophical essays. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Molnar G. (2003) Powers: A study in metaphysics. Oxford University Press, Oxford.
▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Norman D. A. (1999) Affordance, conventions, and design. Interactions 6(3): 38–43.
▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Reed E. & Jones R. (eds.) (1982) Reasons for realism: Selected essays of James J. Gibson. Boston: Houghton-Mifflin.
▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Reed E. S. (1982) An outline of a theory of action systems. Journal of Motor Behavior 14(2): 98–134.
▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Reed E. S. (1991) James Gibson’s ecological approach to cognition. In: Still A. & Costall A. (eds.) Against cognitivism: Alternative foundations for cognitive psychology. Harvester Wheatsheaf, New York: 171–198.
▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Reed E. S. (1996) Encountering the world: Toward an ecological psychology. Oxford University Press, New York.
▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Scarantino A. (2003) Affordances explained. Philosophy of Science 70(5): 949–961.
▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
2019) Affordance types and affordance tokens: Are Gibson’s affordances trustworthy? Ecological Psychology 31(1): 49–75.
▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Tanney J. (2009) Reasons as non-causal, context-placing explanations. In: Sandis C. (ed.), New essays on the explanation of action. Palgrave Macmillan, London: 94–111.
▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Turvey M. (1992) Affordances and prospective control: An outline of the ontology. Ecological Psychology 4(3): 173–187.
▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Wittgenstein L. (1958) The Blue and Brown Books. Basil Blackwell, London.
▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Wittgenstein L. (2001) Philosophical investigations. Blackwell, London. Originally published in 1953.
▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Zhang J. & Patel V. L. (2006) Distributed cognition, representation, and affordance. Pragmatics & Cognition 14(2): 333–341.
▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Comments: 0
To stay informed about comments to this publication and post comments yourself, please log in first.