Can Ecological Psychology Account for Human Agency and Meaningful Experience?
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Open peer commentary on the article “Précis of The Philosophy of Affordances” by Manuel Heras-Escribano. Abstract: I argue that any approach to affordances that stays close to the letter of the law (of traditional Gibsonian ecological psychology) is not able to account for human agency and meaningful experience. I sketch how an approach that follows the spirit of the law can account for these phenomena.
Handling Editor: Alexander Riegler
Dings R. (2020) Can ecological psychology account for human agency and meaningful experience? Constructivist Foundations 15(3): 220–222. https://constructivist.info/15/3/220
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