Author’s Response: Affordances as a Basis for a Post-Cognitivist Approach to the Mind

Heras-Escribano, Manuel

Volume 15 · Number 3 · Pages 231–237

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Author’s Response: Affordances as a Basis for a Post-Cognitivist Approach to the Mind

Manuel Heras-Escribano

Abstract

Abstract: I offer a response to some criticisms raised by the commentators on the basis of the following claims: (a) Disagreements and publicness are not counterexamples to my view on normativity, but cases that are explained by appealing to its social basis. (b) It is possible to offer a general view of experience from a situated and embodied approach based on the concept of affordance but without perverting its scientific basis. (c) The Rylean-inspired dispositionalism that I offer can explain why the concept of affordance is based on the organism-environment complementarity explained in nomological or causal terms without committing to substance ontology. I also try to find a common ground that could work for establishing the conceptual basis of a post-cognitivist, affordance-based approach to the mind.

Handling Editor: Alexander Riegler

Citation

Heras-Escribano M. (2020) Author’s response: Affordances as a basis for a post-cognitivist approach to the mind. Constructivist Foundations 15(3): 231–237. https://constructivist.info/15/3/231

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