Pierce B. (2020) How Can We Distinguish, in Experience, between an Imagined Drawing and a Memorised Motif?. Constructivist Foundations 15(3): 258–260

Volume 15 · Number 3 · Pages 258–260

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How Can We Distinguish, in Experience, between an Imagined Drawing and a Memorised Motif?

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Abstract

Open peer commentary on the article “Visual Representation in the Wild: Empirical Phenomenological Investigation of Visual-spatial Working Memory in a Naturalistic Setting” by Aleš Oblak. Abstract: This commentary requests some further details about the study and raises some concerns about factors that may have affected the findings or the interpretation thereof. These include the possibility that the author’s co-researchers were imagining drawing the motifs and remembering planned movements rather than, or alongside, the motifs themselves. I also discuss the potential effects of differing levels of drawing skills and of experience in the micro-phenomenological method.

Handling Editor: Alexander Riegler

Citation

Pierce B. (2020) How can we distinguish, in experience, between an imagined drawing and a memorised motif? Constructivist Foundations 15(3): 258–260. https://constructivist.info/15/3/258

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References

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