Author’s Response: Does Naturalistic First-Person Research Need Methodological Pluralism?
Aleš Oblak
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Abstract
Abstract: Addressing the methodological issues raised by the commentators, I argue that the disagreement among them regarding the optimal method to gather phenomenal data (micro-phenomenology or descriptive experience sampling) points to the constructive nature of consciousness. Then, I discuss the idea of naturalistic cognitive science (i.e., cognitive science that is relatively free of laboratory constraints. I conclude that if we are to engage in naturalistic first-person research, we must embrace methodological pluralism in order to (a) contend with the constructive nature of consciousness; and (b) account for demand characteristics.
Handling Editor: Alexander Riegler
Citation
Oblak A. (2020) Author’s response: Does naturalistic first-person research need methodological pluralism? Constructivist Foundations 15(3): 266–270. https://constructivist.info/15/3/266
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