Volume 15 · Number 3 · Pages 266–270
Author’s Response: Does Naturalistic First-Person Research Need Methodological Pluralism?

Aleš Oblak

Download the full text in
PDF (141 kB)

> Citation > Similar > References > Add Comment


Abstract: Addressing the methodological issues raised by the commentators, I argue that the disagreement among them regarding the optimal method to gather phenomenal data (micro-phenomenology or descriptive experience sampling) points to the constructive nature of consciousness. Then, I discuss the idea of naturalistic cognitive science (i.e., cognitive science that is relatively free of laboratory constraints. I conclude that if we are to engage in naturalistic first-person research, we must embrace methodological pluralism in order to (a) contend with the constructive nature of consciousness; and (b) account for demand characteristics.

Handling Editor: Alexander Riegler


Oblak A. (2020) Author’s response: Does naturalistic first-person research need methodological pluralism? Constructivist Foundations 15(3): 266–270. https://constructivist.info/15/3/266

Export article citation data: Plain Text · BibTex · EndNote · Reference Manager (RIS)


Clarke A. E. (2019) Situating grounded theory and situational analysis in interpretive qualitative inquiry. In: Bryant A. & Charmaz K. (eds.) The SAGE handbook of current developments in grounded theory. SAGE, New York: 3–48. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Cowan N. (2005) Visual working memory capacity: Essays in cognitive psychology. Psychology Press, New York. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Hanson C. & Gueulette D. G. (1988) Psychotechnology as instructional technology: Systems for a deliberate change in consciousness. ECTJ 36(4): 231–242. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
https://doi.org/10.1093/nc/niy006 ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Husserl E. (1983) Ideas pertaining to a pure phenomenology and to a phenomenological philosophy. Martinus Nijhoff Publishing, The Hague. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Hutchins E. (1993) Cognition in the wild. MIT Press, Cambridge. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Kordeš U. & Demšar E. (2018) Excavating belief about past experience: Experiential dynamics of the reflective act. Constructivist Foundations 13(2): 219–229 https://constructivist.info/13/2/219
Kordeš U., Oblak A., Smrdu M. & Demšar E. (2019) Ethnography of meditation: An account of pursuing meditative practice as a tool for researching consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 26(7–8): 184–237. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Luhrmann T. M. (2020) Mind and spirit: A comparative theory about representation of mind and the experience of spirit. Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute 26(S1): 9–27. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Lush P., Moga G., McLatchie N. & Dienes Z. (2018) The Sussex-Waterloo Scale of Hypnotizability (SWASH): Measuring capacity for altering conscious experience. Neuroscience of Consciousness 2018(1): niy006. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Lush P., Naish P. & Dienes Z. (2016) Metacognition of intentions in mindfulness and hypnosis. Neuroscience of Consciousness 2016(1): niw007. https://doi.org/10.1093/nc/niw007
Matusz P. J., Dikker S., Huth A. G. & Perrodin C. (2019) Are we ready for real-world neuroscience? Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience 31(3): 327–338. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Nichols A. L. & Manner J. K. (2008) The good-subject effect: Investigating participant demand characteristics. The Journal of General Psychology 135(2): 151–166. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Oblak A. (2020) What is the how: Participatory sense-making as consensual validation of phenomenal data. Preprint at PsyArXiv. https://doi.org/10.31234/osf.io/b8vdy
Pachoud B. (1999) The teleological dimension of perceptual and motor intentionality. In: Petitot J., Varela F. J., Pachoud B. & Roy J. (eds.) Naturalizing phenomenology: Issues in contemporary phenomenology and cognitive science. Stanford University Press, Stanford: 196–219. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Petitmengin C. & Lachaux J. (2013) Microcognitive science: Bridging experiential and neuronal microdynamics. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 7: 617. https://doi.org/10.3389/fnhum.2013.00617
Ratcliffe M. (2008) Feelings of being: Phenomenology, psychiatry and the sense of reality. Oxford University Press, Oxford. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Steels L. (2008) The symbol grounding problem has been solved: So what’s next. In: de Vega M., Glenberg A. & Graesser A. (eds.) Symbols and embodiment: Debates on meaning and cognition. Oxford University Press, Oxford: 223–244. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar

Comments: 0

To stay informed about comments to this publication and post comments yourself, please log in first.