Volume 16 · Number 2 ·
Pages 163–166
Panqualityism as a Critical Metaphysics for Neurophenomenology
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Abstract
Open peer commentary on the article “The Tangled Dialectic of Body and Consciousness: A Metaphysical Counterpart of Radical Neurophenomenology” by Michel Bitbol. Abstract: I examine Michel Bitbol’s proposal of a metaphysical counterpart of neurophenomenology, arguing that such a metaphysics should address the issue of the origin of consciousness. This can be accomplished through panqualityism, which conceives of the subject and object of experience as grounded in a flow of pre-phenomenal qualities. I conclude by framing this view in terms of a critical metaphysics that is consistent with the pragmatic and existential dimension of neurophenomenology.
Citation
Pace Giannotta A. (2021) Panqualityism as a critical metaphysics for neurophenomenology. Constructivist Foundations 16(2): 163–166. https://constructivist.info/16/2/163
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