Oblak A. (2021) The Hell of Being Who One Ordinarily Is: Is it Possible to Construct Stable Phenomenological Traits of Mood Disorders?. Constructivist Foundations 16(2): 227–229

Volume 16 · Number 2 · Pages 227–229

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The Hell of Being Who One Ordinarily Is: Is it Possible to Construct Stable Phenomenological Traits of Mood Disorders?

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Abstract

Open peer commentary on the article “Assessing Subjective Processes and Vulnerability in Mindfulness-based Interventions: A Mixed methods Exploratory Study” by Sebastián Medeiros, Carla Crempien, Alejandra Vásquez-Rosati, Javiera Duarte, Catherine Andreu, Álvaro I. Langer, Miguel Ibaceta, Jaime R. Silva & Diego Cosmelli Sánchez. Abstract: Assuming that the only epistemically relevant experiential report is the one made in the present moment, it may be unclear how individuals ground their responses to stable-trait assessments. Recently, novel approaches (such as the phenomenological control) suggest that it is possible to construct stable phenomenological traits. Questions are raised as to whether there are first-person reports suggesting the nature of stable phenomenological traits in the context of mood disorders.

Citation

Oblak A. (2021) The hell of being who one ordinarily is: Is it possible to construct stable phenomenological traits of mood disorders? Constructivist Foundations 16(2): 227–229. https://constructivist.info/16/2/227

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