The Lived Experience of Being Fragile: On Becoming more “Living” During the Pandemic
Natalie Depraz
Log in to download the full text for free
> Citation
> Similar
> References
> Add Comment
Abstract
Context: The topic of my article, fragility, is a theme that has been little broached in philosophy and phenomenology, except by Ricœur, in the fifties, and recently Chrétien. I aim to bring it into light, anew, with a micro-phenomenological approach. Problem: How does fragility, far from referring to a weak living being, makes us feel more alive, and how does the pandemic time we are going through intensify our feeling of being “living? Method: I chose to use a first-person method related to micro-phenomenology, self-explicitation. As a writing method, it fits the time of loneliness in which we were immersed in lockdown better. I produced two small self-explicitations referring to two salient moments of awareness of my fragility. They reveal a contrasted feeling of fragility, negative/positive, an existential loneliness leading to a time regained, a huge difficulty to breathe awakening an imminent death feeling and then an amplified breathing. Results: Not only is fragility not a weakening of my being, but it results in my being more alive. Moreover, the article shows that fragility is not a mere state: it entails a peculiar micro-dynamics made of two phases, negative/positive. Implications: This contribution offers a first insight into the dynamics of lived fragilization from a micro-phenomenological viewpoint. It needs to be developed further with other self-explicitations and interviews. Another challenge is to compare the philosophical results with the micro-phenomenological ones. Constructivist content: This article links to the constructivist perspective founded by Vermersch. It puts to the fore the first-person self-explicitation method as a precious tool to uncover limit experiences of loneliness and imminent dying, sometimes hard to broach during an interview.
Key words: Micro-phenomenology, self-explicitation, lived experience, living, fragility, pandemic, time, house, lockdown, awakening.
Citation
Depraz N. (2021) The lived experience of being fragile: On becoming more “living” during the pandemic. Constructivist Foundations 16(3): 245–253. https://constructivist.info/16/3/245
Export article citation data:
Plain Text ·
BibTex ·
EndNote ·
Reference Manager (RIS)
Similar articles
References
Beauvoir S. de (1949) Le deuxième sexe. Volume 1. Folio, Paris. English translation: Beauvoir S. de (1997) The second sex. Vintage Classics, New York.
▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Beck U. (1986) Risikogesellschaft: Auf dem Weg in eine andere Moderne [Risk society: On the way to a different modern age]. Suhrkamp, Frankfurt am Main.
▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Binswanger L. (1960) Melancholie und Manie: Phänomenologische Studien [Melancholy and mania: Phenomenological studies]. Verlag Günther Neske, Pfullingen.
▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Blanchot M. (1994) L’Instant de ma mort. Gallimard, Paris. English translation: Blanchot M. (2000) The instant of my death. Stanford University Press, Redwood City CA.
▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Camus A. (1985) Le mythe de Sisyphe [The Myth of Sisyphus]. Gallimard, Paris. Originally published in 1942.
▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Cioran E. (1987) De l’inconvénient d’être né [The disadvantage of being born] Folio, Paris. Originally published in 1967.
▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Deleuze G. & Guattari F. (2015) Capitalisme et schizophrénie I: L’anti-œdipe. Minuit, Paris. Originally published in 1972. English translation: Deleuze G. & Guattari F. (2009) Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and schizophrenia. Penguin Classics, New York.
▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Depraz N. & Cosmelli D. (2003) Empathy and openness: Practices of intersubjectivity at the core of the science of consciousness. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 33(supp. 1): 163–203.
▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Depraz N. (2013) D’une science descriptive de l’expérience en première personne: Pour une phénoménologie expérientielle [A descriptive science of first-person experience: For an experiential phenomenology]. Studia Phaenomenologica 13(1): 387–402.
▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Depraz N. (2018) La surprise du sujet: Un sujet cardial [The surprise of the subject: A cardial subject]. Zeta Books, Bucarest. [§30]
▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Depraz N. (2021) Microphenomenology of chronicity in psychosomatic diseases: Diabetes, anorexia, schizophrenia. In: Tewes C. & Stanghellini G. (eds.) Time and Body: Phenomenological and psychopathological approaches. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge: 82–97.
▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Foessel M. (2012) Après la fin du monde: Critique de la raison apocalyptique [Beyond the end of the world: Critique of the apocalyptical reason]. Seuil, Paris.
▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Freud S. (1920) Jenseits des Lustprinzips. Internationaler Psychoanalytischer Verlag, Vienna. English translation: Freud S. (2001) Beyond the pleasure principle. Complete psychological works, Volume 18. Vintage Books, New York.
▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Gamber K. (1993) The reform of the Roman liturgy: Its problems and background. Una Voce Press, Harrison NY. German original published in 1979.
▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Garcia M. (2018) On ne naît pas soumise, on le devient [You are not born submissive, you become submissive]. Flammarion, Paris.
▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Garrau M. (2018) Politiques de la vulnérabilité [Politics of vulnerability]. CNRS Editions, Paris.
▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Heidegger M. (1927) Sein und Zeit. Max Niemeyer, Tübingen. English translation: Heidegger M. (2010) Being and time. Revised edition. State University of New York Press, New York.
▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Husserl E. (1939) Erfahrung und Urteil: Untersuchungen zur Genealogie der Logik. Meiner, Hamburg, English translation: Husserl E. (1975) Experience and judgment. Edited and translated by Ludwig Landgrebe. Northwestern University Press, Evanston IL.
▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Kessler D. (2002) Ulrich Beck et la société du risque [Ulrich Beck and the society of risk]. Commentaire 100: 889–892.
▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Levinas E. (1998) Otherwise than being: Or beyond essence. Translated by Alphonso Lingis. Kluwer, Dordrecht. French original published as: Levinas E. (1978) Autrement qu’être ou au delà de l’essence. Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague.
▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Locke J. (1997) An essay concerning human understanding. Penguin Classics, London. Originally published in 1690.
▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Lordon F. (2010) Capitalisme, désir et servitude [Capitalism, desire and servitude]. La Fabrique Editions, Paris.
▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Merleau-Ponty M. (2003) Nature. Course Notes from the Collège de France, Northwestern University Press, Evanston IL. French original published as: Merleau-Ponty M. (1995) La nature: Notes, cours du Collège de France. Seuil, Paris.
▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Nussbaum M. (2001) The fragility of goodness: Luck and ethics in Greek tragedy and philosophy. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Originally published in 1986.
▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Popper P. (1959) The logic of scientific discovery. Hutchinson & Co, London. German original published in 1934.
▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Ricœur P. (1987) Fallible man: Philosophy of the will. Fordham University Press, New York. French original published as: Ricœur P. (1960) La philosophie de la volonté. Volume 2: Finitude et culpabilité. Seuil, Paris.
▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Sophrony (2016) Saint Silouane l’Athonite (1866–1938): Vie, doctrine, écrits. Cerf, Paris. English original published in 1991.
▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Trungpa C. (2010) Meditation in action. Shambhala, Boston. Originally published in 1970.
▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Vermersch P. (2014) Le dessin de vécu dans la recherche en premiere personne: Pratique de l’auto-explicitation [The drawing of lived experience in first person research: Practice of self-explicitation]. In: Depraz N. (ed.) Première, deuxième, troisième personne. Zetabooks, Bucarest: 195–233.
▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Comments: 0
To stay informed about comments to this publication and post comments yourself, please log in first.
