Volume 16 · Number 3 · Pages 308–310
Fractality is an Amodal Property

Oliver Lukitsch

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Abstract

Open peer commentary on the article “Phenomenological Properties of Perceptual Presence: A Constructivist Grounded Theory Approach” by Aleš Oblak, Asena Boyadzhieva & Jure Bon. Abstract: Oblak, Boyadzhieva, and Bon claim that fractality is a modal property of the experience of perceptual presence. I will instead argue that the concept of fractality implies amodality and that modal sense data are neither necessary nor sufficient for fractality.

Citation

Lukitsch O. (2021) Fractality is an amodal property. Constructivist Foundations 16(3): 308–310. https://constructivist.info/16/3/308

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References

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