Perceptual Presence as Enactive Inference

Kriegleder, Moritz F.

Volume 16 · Number 3 · Pages 313–314

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Perceptual Presence as Enactive Inference

Moritz F. Kriegleder

Abstract

Open peer commentary on the article “Phenomenological Properties of Perceptual Presence: A Constructivist Grounded Theory Approach” by Aleš Oblak, Asena Boyadzhieva & Jure Bon. Abstract: I reflect on the notion of lived space and affective resonance as discussed in the target article in the light of the theory of active inference. Interpreting perceptual presence as a form of enactive inference could link the findings presented in the article to a richer theoretical framework that allows for quantitative modelling and neurophenomenological extensions of the present study design. Implementing mutual constraints from complementary neurological or behavioral data could validate or adapt the categories derived in the article.

Citation

Kriegleder M. F. (2021) Perceptual presence as enactive inference. Constructivist Foundations 16(3): 313–314. https://constructivist.info/16/3/313

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