Bogotá J. D. & Colombetti G. (2022) Can There Be a Unified 5E Theory of Pain?. Constructivist Foundations 17(2): 150–152

Volume 17 · Number 2 · Pages 150–152

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Can There Be a Unified 5E Theory of Pain?

Juan Diego Bogotá & Giovanna Colombetti

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Abstract

Open peer commentary on the article “Kaleidoscope of Pain: What and How Do You See Through It” by Maja Smrdu. Abstract: We agree with Smrdu that pain cannot be reduced to a neurophysiological event and we welcome a (micro-)phenomenological investigation of pain experience. However, we do not think such an investigation can provide sufficient support for either a 5E theory of pain, or (just) an enactive one. A 5E theory of pain would require a clarification of how the 5Es fit together. An enactive account would require a “circulation” between first- and third-person data.

Citation

Bogotá J. D. & Colombetti G. (2022) Can there be a unified 5e theory of pain? Constructivist Foundations 17(2): 150–152. https://constructivist.info/17/2/150

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