Volume 17 · Number 3 · Pages 236–238
Representations of and by the Extended Mind

Moritz F. Kriegleder

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Open peer commentary on the article “A Moving Boundary, a Plastic Core: A Contribution to the Third Wave of Extended-Mind Research” by Timotej Prosen. Abstract: The role of representation in the extended mind is central to understanding the philosophical commitments of the hypothesis and its relation to other accounts of cognition. While the target article provides an important analysis of the development and outlook for the extended mind and its relation to enactivism and active inference, it does not discuss the possibility of the free-energy framework as non-representational. I argue that such a reading allows for more fruitful exchanges between the extended mind, enactivism, and active inference.


Kriegleder M. F. (2022) Representations of and by the extended mind. Constructivist Foundations 17(3): 236–238. https://constructivist.info/17/3/236

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