A Defence of Starmaking Constructivism: The Problem of Stuff

Liu, Bin

Volume 17 · Number 3 · Pages 252–263

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A Defence of Starmaking Constructivism: The Problem of Stuff

Bin Liu

Abstract

Context: There is still no detailed defence of Goodman’s starmaking constructivism against the objection Boghossian presented in his 2006 book, Fear of Knowledge. Problem: I defend Goodman’s constructivism against the problem of stuff raised by Boghossian, that is, that constructivism requires unconstructed stuff and thus cannot explain all features in the world. Method: I argue that there is a way out for constructivists when they face the problem of stuff. Constructivists can choose to accept a constructivist-friendly worldview and the problem of stuff does not hold in this worldview. Goodman already provides hints for such a worldview in his works. I articulate the worldview in detail and argue that it does not have obvious faults. Results: I show that starmaking constructivism does not have the problem of stuff at least under a certain tenable worldview. Implications: The constructivist-friendly worldview and related novel ideas could be used to defend starmaking constructivism against other objections in Boghossian’s book and is helpful in answering other philosophical questions such as the mind-matter problem and modality. Constructivist content: This article may contribute to reviving Goodman’s starmaking constructivism.

Key words: Anti-foundationalism, bundle theory, constructivism, phenomenalism.

Citation

Liu B. (2022) A defence of starmaking constructivism: The problem of stuff. Constructivist Foundations 17(3): 252–263. https://constructivist.info/17/3/252

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