“Cartesian” Relational Cognition and Organism-Centered Cognitive Agency

Facchin, Marco

Volume 18 · Number 3 · Pages 378–380

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“Cartesian” Relational Cognition and Organism-Centered Cognitive Agency

Marco Facchin

Abstract

Open peer commentary on the article “Beyond Individual-Centred 4E Cognition: Systems Biology and Sympoiesis” by Mads Julian Dengsø & Michael David Kirchhoff. Abstract: I examine the authors’ concept of relational cognition, showing that it has two possible readings, both more “cartesian” than the authors suppose. Whence the authors’ “anti-cartesianism,” then? I suggest it is due to an understanding of cognition that allows cognition to operate at very long timescales, and provide an argument to resist such an understanding.

Citation

Facchin M. (2023) “cartesian” relational cognition and organism-centered cognitive agency. Constructivist Foundations 18(3): 378–380. https://constructivist.info/18/3/378

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