Volume 18 · Number 3 · Pages 378–380
“Cartesian” Relational Cognition and Organism-Centered Cognitive Agency

Marco Facchin

Log in to download the full text for free

> Citation > Similar > References > Add Comment


Open peer commentary on the article “Beyond Individual-Centred 4E Cognition: Systems Biology and Sympoiesis” by Mads Julian Dengsø & Michael David Kirchhoff. Abstract: I examine the authors’ concept of relational cognition, showing that it has two possible readings, both more “cartesian” than the authors suppose. Whence the authors’ “anti-cartesianism,” then? I suggest it is due to an understanding of cognition that allows cognition to operate at very long timescales, and provide an argument to resist such an understanding.


Facchin M. (2023) “cartesian” relational cognition and organism-centered cognitive agency. Constructivist Foundations 18(3): 378–380. https://constructivist.info/18/3/378

Export article citation data: Plain Text · BibTex · EndNote · Reference Manager (RIS)


Clark A. (2008) Supersizing the mind. Oxford University Press, New York. Reviewed in. https://constructivist.info/5/2/097
Di Paolo E. (2009) Extended life. Topoi 28: 9–21. https://cepa.info/322
Facchin M. (2023) Why can’t we say what cognition is (at least for the time being). Philosophy and the Mind Sciences 4. https://doi.org/10.33735/phimisci.2023.9664
Fodor J. (1987) Psychosemantics. MIT Press, Cambridge MA. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Gallagher S. (2017) Enactivist interventions. Oxford University Press, New York. Reviewed in. https://constructivist.info/14/1/118
Kirchhoff M. D. & Kiverstein J. (2019) Extended consciousness and predictive processing: A third-wave view. Routledge, New York. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Kirchhoff M. D. & Kiverstein J. (2020) Attuning to the world: The diachronic constitution of the extended conscious mind. Frontiers in Psychology 11: 1966. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2020.01966
Menary R. (2007) Cognitive integration. Palgrave, London. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Mendelovici A. (2018) The phenomenal basis of intentionality. Oxford University Press, Oxford. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Rowlands M. (2009) Enactivism and the extended mind. Topoi 28: 53–62. https://cepa.info/2287
Searle J. R. (1980) Minds, brains, and programs. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3(3): 417–424. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Thelen E. & Smith L. (1994) A dynamic systems approach to the development of cognition and action. The MIT Press, Cambridge. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Thompson E. & Stapleton M. (2009) Making sense of sense-making: Reflections on enactive and extended mind theories. Topoi 28: 23–30. https://cepa.info/2290
Wheeler M. (2010) Mind, things and materiality. In: Renfrew C. & Malafouris L. (eds.) The cognitive life of things: Recasting the boundaries of the mind. McDonald Institute for Archaeological Research Publications, Cambridge: 29–39. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar
Wilson R. A. (1994) Wide computationalism. Mind 103(411): 351–372. ▸︎ Google︎ Scholar

Comments: 0

To stay informed about comments to this publication and post comments yourself, please log in first.