Kletzl S. (2023) Screen Creatures as Subjects?. Constructivist Foundations 18(3): 400–402

Volume 18 · Number 3 · Pages 400–402

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Screen Creatures as Subjects?

Sebastian Kletzl

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Abstract

Open peer commentary on the article “The World of Screen Creatures” by Bin Liu. Abstract: Liu proposes that in order to get rid of any representational perceptual relation we should interpret ourselves as screen creatures, i.e., as content that can be displayed on a screen from which we then construct our surroundings. I focus on two topics. The first topic is how exactly to understand the idea of “screen creatures” so that they can be interpreted as functioning human subjects. The second topic is about the whole theoretical setup and how it can be reconciled with Ockham’s razor.

Citation

Kletzl S. (2023) Screen creatures as subjects? Constructivist Foundations 18(3): 400–402. https://constructivist.info/18/3/400

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References

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