Why Radical Constructivism Has not Become a Paradigm
Volker Gadenne
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Abstract
Problem: The paper investigates some reasons why RC has not become a mainstream endeavor. Method: The central assumptions of RC are summarized. Analysis is made of how each of these assumptions corresponds to other views, especially to intuitive beliefs that are widely accepted. Is RC consistent with these beliefs, supported by them, or incompatible with them? Results: The construction hypothesis is supported by the results of cognitive science and neurophysiology. However, the closed-system hypothesis and antirealism are in conflict with deeply rooted convictions of most people. Some ethical and educational aspects claimed by RC are generally accepted but they are not specifically implications of RC. Implications: In the near future, RC will probably not become the leading paradigm or a mainstream endeavor in the sciences or in philosophy.
Key words: closed-system hypothesis, fallibilism, intentionality, pluralism, realism, tolerance
Citation
Gadenne V. (2010) Why radical constructivism has not become a paradigm. Constructivist Foundations 6(1): 77–83. http://constructivist.info/6/1/077
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