Onwards and Upwards, Radical Constructivism. A Guest Commentary
Peter Cariani
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Abstract
Problem: How can radical constructivism gain wider recognition and acceptance? Method: Based on informal direct observation of other social and intellectual movements, the social and psychological dynamics and organizational imperatives of radical constructivism as an intellectual movement are discussed. Results: Various means of structuring the movement in order to gain wider acceptance are proposed. Implications: We hope that the paper has value in helping the radical constructivism movement evaluate where it has been and where it might go in terms of wider social recognition and acceptance.
Key words: intellectual movements, history of cybernetics, evolutionary robotics, constructivist epistemology
Citation
Cariani P. (2010) Onwards and upwards, radical constructivism. A guest commentary. Constructivist Foundations 6(1): 127–132. http://constructivist.info/6/1/127
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