Is the “Core Self” a Construct? Review of “Subjectivity and Selfhood: Investigating the First-Person Perspective” by Dan Zahavi
Claire Petitmengin
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Abstract
Upshot: Is lived experience always the experience of a self? The central thesis of Dan Zahavi’s book is that there is a “minimal” or “core” self, according to which a quality of “self-givenness” is a constitutive feature of experience. The adoption of a dynamic phenomenological perspective leads us to call this thesis into question.
Citation
Petitmengin C. (2011) Is the “core self” a construct? Review of “subjectivity and selfhood: Investigating the first-person perspective” by dan zahavi. Constructivist Foundations 6(2): 270–274. http://constructivist.info/6/2/270
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References
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