@inproceedings{Riegler38,
author = {Riegler A.},
title = {Cognitive systems do not pick up knowledge from the environment},
year = {2005},
URL = {https://constructivist.info/riegler/38},
editor = {Russell, A. et al.}
booktitle = {Proceedings of AMKLC’05. International symposium on adaptive models of knowledge, language and cognition}
publisher = {Helsinki University of Technology, Espoo}
place = {Finland}
pages = {1--7}
}

%0 Conference Paper
%A Riegler A.
%T Cognitive systems do not pick up knowledge from the environment
%D 2005
%U https://constructivist.info/riegler/38
%E Russell, A. et al.
%B Proceedings of AMKLC’05. International symposium on adaptive models of knowledge, language and cognition
%I Helsinki University of Technology, Espoo
%C Finland
%P 1-7
%X The conventional philosophical perspective on knowledge and meaning suffers from at least two problems: the proper definition of truth, and the use of propositions as a basic vehicle for knowledge. By contrast, naturalized accounts such as evolutionary epistemology and radical constructivism offer a broader conceptual frame which allows to include the cognition of animals and artifacts as well. The paper explores a possible mechanism, the cognitive psychologist notion of schemata-controlled information pickup against a radical constructivist backdrop. I outline the importance of embodiment and autopoietic systems, which control their input rather than their output. The latter is considered the perspective of the observer-designer of cognitive artifacts. Using insights from philosophy and empirical results, the paper presents the implications of a radical constructivist understanding of knowledge and meaning. These include the rejection of premises evolutionary epistemology is based upon, and point in the direction of how to implement knowledge systems. The paper concludes with a call for closed-loop systems.
%2 epistemology

PT - CHAP
A1 - Riegler A.
T1 - Cognitive systems do not pick up knowledge from the environment
Y1 - 2005
UR - https://constructivist.info/riegler/38
AB - The conventional philosophical perspective on knowledge and meaning suffers from at least two problems: the proper definition of truth, and the use of propositions as a basic vehicle for knowledge. By contrast, naturalized accounts such as evolutionary epistemology and radical constructivism offer a broader conceptual frame which allows to include the cognition of animals and artifacts as well. The paper explores a possible mechanism, the cognitive psychologist notion of schemata-controlled information pickup against a radical constructivist backdrop. I outline the importance of embodiment and autopoietic systems, which control their input rather than their output. The latter is considered the perspective of the observer-designer of cognitive artifacts. Using insights from philosophy and empirical results, the paper presents the implications of a radical constructivist understanding of knowledge and meaning. These include the rejection of premises evolutionary epistemology is based upon, and point in the direction of how to implement knowledge systems. The paper concludes with a call for closed-loop systems.
ER -

Riegler A. (2005) Cognitive systems do not pick up knowledge from the environment. In: Russell, A. et al. (eds.) Proceedings of AMKLC’05. International symposium on adaptive models of knowledge, language and cognition. Helsinki University of Technology, Espoo, Finland, pp. 1–7. Available at https://constructivist.info/riegler/38